Revised version of paper presented at the July 1998 conference of the National Institute of Christian Education, Sydney.
The Nature of Knowledge:
Some educational implications concerning indoctrination
David Burke[i]
Abstract
Indoctrination is generally regarded as the dark side of educational activity and some would exclude it from that which is properly labelled education. Religious education is sometimes identified as a paradigm case of indoctrination, in part, because the nature of religious knowledge is held to exclude educational possibilities and compel indoctrinating practices. However, several factors suggest that religious education is not, of necessity, indoctrination. These factors include varied analyses of the nature of religious knowledge; argument that all knowledge forms part of belief systems; the distinction between formative and critical education; and the nature of the relationships between epistemology and pedagogy.
Education and indoctrination
Indoctrination and education are frequently set against each other in scholarly discussion. In part this arises from understandings of education, which stress the ideal of learner autonomy and discussions of indoctrination, which focus on its denial.
Hence Peters (, 1983, p.44) who sees autonomy as a key educational virtue and threats to it as vices, Gardner (1991, p.69) who mentions autonomy as key to the liberal idea of education, and Kazepides (1983, p.260) who speaks of how ‘... all education must prepare for self education.’
Discussions of indoctrination centre on issues of method, content, intention and consequences (eg, Leahy, 1990, p.432; Astley, 1994, p.45-48; and Sealey, 1985, p.63-65). Method wise, indoctrination is held to be education without the presence and development of critical faculties enabling learners to appraise learning content (eg, Leahy, 1990, p.432). The content of indoctrinating education includes non-evidential propositions (McLaughlin, 1995, p.155) such as ‘... superstitions, prejudices, doctrines, false beliefs and the like’ (Kazepides, 1987, p.398). With regard to intent and consequences, indoctrination is said to aim at beliefs being held in a manner impervious to criticism (Peters, 1983, p.83) and which stick by non-rational means (Sealey, 1985, p.61-2), such as to create ‘... a condition where rationality is distorted by accepting arbitrary claims as foundational’ (Morgan, 1996, p.247).
Religious education - a paradigm case of indoctrination?
As distinct from education about religion, which is of a phenomenological nature, religious bodies may offer education in religion. As defined by Astley, with application to the Christian churches, this is a ‘... confessional, churchly activity of evangelism, instruction and nurture’ (Astley, 1994, p.9). It is religious education, which tries to nurture belief where it is present and foster it where it is not.
For some, this, along with Marxist political education, is a paradigm case of indoctrination. Hence Kazepides (1987, p.398) who cites issues of content, educational methods and goals. Astley refers to Hirst’s view that ‘Christian education’ is a contradiction in terms, on the criteria of learning content and educational goals (Astley, 1994, p.41). Gardner expresses concern over belief involving an autonomy denying acceptance, the role of authority figures in religious education (Gardner, 1991, p.74-78) and doubts Hare and McLaughlin’s argument that people can be both committed to a belief and open minded (Gardner, 1996, p.274).
The content of religious education has been given particular attention as a feature constituting indoctrination. For Peters, the question of whether religion is a matter of knowledge is central to debate about the possibility of religious education (Peters, 1983, p.46). Hirst is just one cited for holding the view that because religion is fundamentally a matter of belief, not knowledge, there cannot be religious education (Phillips, 1970, p.440).
The nature of religious knowledge
Accounts of religious knowledge vary widely with respect to its sources, justification and certainty.
Sources of religious knowledge might include intuition (as in private revelations or perceptions); evidence and reason (as in natural theology of both a rationalistic and empiricist bent); and authorities (as in divine revelation in Scripture, or divine testimony in church tradition).
These different sources of religious knowledge give rise to different justifications. Foundationalist justifications hold that religious knowledge rests on certain indubitable and incorrigible foundations which are open to inspection and from which subsequent truths are deduced. Fideist justifications stress the importance of the act of commitment and the ‘eye of faith’ as preliminaries to an inner persuasion of the truth of religious claims. Coherentist justifications speak of systems of religious knowledge which are commended as consistent, comprehensive and congruent. Others again speak of the importance of underlying dispositions and presuppositions in which the content and justification of religious knowledge, like all knowledge, is dependent on the ‘rules of the game’ with which people start. A useful introduction to the range of positions regarding the nature of religious knowledge is found in Geivatt & Sweetman, (1992).
In turn, religious knowledge is seen to have varying degrees of certainty ranging from the sceptical, to the probable and to the certain, in which there is seen to be a high level of correspondence between the content of religious knowledge claims and things as they are.
These varied accounts are educationally important because they contribute to different evaluations of how far religious knowledge is compatible with conventionally accepted accounts of knowledge and therefore admissible as a proper object of education. Hence Hull’s observation that traditional theology is treated as a divine ‘given’ and is therefore in tension with education (Hull, 1996, p.97). Gates notes that fewer problems arise with intuitive models of religious knowledge or with ‘inductive’ uses of the Bible which approach it with assumptions of fallibility and the active use of critical apparatus (Gates 1996a, p.viii; 1996b, p.19). Referring to views of religious knowledge which ‘infallibilise’ either the Bible, church or conscience, he observes that the denial of freedom is at its strongest here: ‘... a logical transition from that to a desire to control the lives and thoughts of individuals ..’ (Gates, 1996b, p.24).
This paper will now focus on traditional accounts of religious knowledge because they appear to raise the more serious problems with respect to the matter of indoctrination. Such accounts tend to see Christian knowledge as deriving from authoritative sources, having foundationalist, presuppositionalist or modified coherentist justifications and as having high levels of certainty.
Traditional Christian theology is expressed in doctrines. Attention has been given to the links between the nature of doctrines and the educational question of indoctrination.
Doctrines are the formal expression of religious ‘beliefs that’ which, in turn, arise from ‘beliefs in’.
A useful analysis of doctrines is provided by Thiessen who refers to their systematic character, comprehensive scope; and momentous subject matter (Thiessen, 1982, p.377-381). He also refers to the function of doctrines in belief systems. They are the first order principles on which later generalisations and observational statements rest (p.391). As will be noted later, Thiessen sees close parallels between these functions and the first order principles of knowledge systems in the sciences.
Kazepides is highly critical of doctrines and raises issues which go to the heart of the question as to whether religious education deals with something properly called ‘knowledge’. He distinguishes between hard and soft forms of doctrines. ‘Soft’ constructions are merely unjustified rules for life dressed up in word pictures (Kazepides, 1987, p.403). In ‘hard’ constructions doctrines combine some or all of the following elements: they are unfalsifiable, outside the criteria of rationality, form part of a comprehensive system, have prescriptive functions, and presuppose authorities to support (Kazepides, 1987, 402-3). Whether ‘hard’ or ‘soft’: ‘... however one interprets doctrines they do not belong within our rational tradition and therefore they should have no place within our educational institutions’ (Kazepides, 1987, p.404).
A chorus of voices echo these views. Hence the view that faith commitments are a matter of how the world is seen in a way that is not open to empirical refutation (Sealey, 1985, p.12); reference to religious views as totalising but scientific uncertain (Gardner, 1991, p.72); and Kazepides’ earlier view that religious beliefs are knowledge stoppers because they violate criteria of good knowledge and are ‘... one of the most effective ways of undermining the building of an open society’ (Kazepides, 1983, p.264).
In short, religious doctrines are charged with failing the conventional test for knowledge that it is justified true belief. By being outside conventional justification by scientific means, religious statements cannot hold any recognisable truth-value. If taught simply as matters of belief, opinion or perspective, religious statements are educationally less problematical. However, on the above views of doctrines: ‘.. teaching religious beliefs in any way which suggest that they might be true cannot amount to anything less than indoctrination’ (Carr, D. 1994, p.227).
Response
The above material constitutes a substantial challenge to religious education as being unacceptable because it constitutes indoctrination.
In the remaining part of this paper, several considerations relevant to that challenge are discussed.
One solution to the challenge of indoctrination in religious education would be to give one side or the other of the problem away. Thus, someone with an educational presupposition in favour of autonomy and against indoctrination might solve the 'problem' by reconstructing their notion of religious knowledge into a 'softer' form. On the other hand, someone with a theological presupposition in favour of a traditional construction of religious knowledge might solve the problem by making indoctrination a tolerable practice, if not a virtue.
However, abandoning one side or another of the problem is hardly a solution. People cannot be reasonably expected to abandon beliefs important to them just because they conflict with an educational ideal. Nor should they be encouraged to make a virtue out of indoctrination merely to solve a problem.
1. Is religious knowledge really different?
The material reviewed earlier suggested that religious knowledge is of a fundamentally different nature to conventional knowledge and that these differences create a disposition to indoctrinating practices. Knowledge given by divine authority, not open to critical questioning and outside of conventional evidence testing was seen as undermining or contradicting autonomy in learners.
It is hard to deny that traditional accounts of religious knowledge do have these characteristics and that indoctrination is a possibility in religious education.
However, it is worth considering whether the difference between religious and scientific knowledge is one of kind or degree. If it is a difference of degree, this raises further questions as to whether the teaching of doctrines compels indoctrination or whether the teaching of religious doctrines, like all knowledge, involves, finally, a body of beliefs, paradigms or assumptions on which knowledge rests. In this latter case, it behoves all educators to be aware of and to make explicit the basis and nature of the knowledge they teach.
Following Kuhn's work on paradigms and Polanyi's work on the role of presuppositions in all thought, elements of a belief structure have been identified as underlying scientific knowledge.
Thiessen argues that all forms of knowledge involve central beliefs which are broad in scope and neither verifiable nor falsifiable (Thiessen, 1982, p.392). These beliefs act as epistemic primitives (Leahy and Laura, 1992, p.335) on which further knowledge is built (Cooling, 1994, p.43), against which evidence is tested and interpreted and which define a system of knowledge held by a community sharing the basic beliefs.
An example of such a belief is the assumption of inductive predictability underlying empirical science. Commitment to this belief persists, despite the enduring scepticism of Hume. This is a core belief, a presupposition, an epistemic primitive which, with other such beliefs, defines the scientific community and sets the parameters for its research and its evaluation.
Commitment to inductive logic is not irrational or lacking evidence. However, it is one of those points where sceptical regress either stops, and science proceeds on the basis of a formally unjustified assumption, or the regress continues to infinity and any possibility of empirical knowledge collapses (Astley, 1989, p.64).
Thiessen insists that scientific and religious beliefs are not polar opposites and that they share common features. Science, like religion, is capable of false beliefs and beliefs with ambiguous evidence. Religious beliefs, like scientific, do change and are widely accepted. Scientific beliefs, like doctrines, have momentous content and systematic character and evolution is just one example of evangelistic fervour in scientific circles (Thiessen, 1982, p.383-392). Therefore, argues Thiessen, not all religious beliefs fit the criteria of doctrine, but some scientific beliefs do. Indoctrination and education are possible in both (Thiessen, 1982, p.392).
Kazepides grants the existence of bedrock beliefs underlying scientific knowledge, but argues that they are different to religious doctrines in that they involve criteria of rationality, have alternatives, are acquired by thought or justification, can be doubted, and enable, rather than exclude, thought (Kazepides, 1987, p.405).
Different bedrock beliefs constitute different systems of knowledge and rationality can be assessed within systems as well as between systems. On this basis, rationality is not so much a matter of objective detachment, as a matter of internal consistency and a systemic pattern of beliefs (Astley, 1989, p.55). The difference between religious belief and its denial is not then a '... difference between rational and irrational beliefs, but between holders of different epistemic primitives for ordering a particular area of experience' (Leahy and Laura, 1997, p.337).
This understanding of knowledge represents a welcome humility in which claims to universality are set aside and the contribution of presuppositions is acknowledged. Knowledge does have a social aspect, in which communities of people bound together by common starting points view the world in similar ways and are able to explore, agree and disagree within a shared framework.
Acknowledgement of the role of presuppositional communities could result in a view of knowledge, which is both Balkanised and detached from any claims to represent reality. This is a phenomenological view, where '... truth reduces (at best) to some uncertain blend of coherence and utility (Carr, 1994, p. 224). This is far from the claims of both traditional religion and traditional science.
Understandings of both religious and scientific knowledge benefits from analysis of the role of presuppositions and the corresponding acknowledgement that traditional foundationalism lacks credibility. To do this is '... therefore to recognise the inescapably provisional nature of much if not all human knowledge' (Carr, D, 1994, p.236).
However, the epistemic baby need not be washed out with the foundationalist bath water in the case of either science or religion. Accounts of knowledge which lay emphasis on coherence, consistency, comprehensiveness and congruency allow for recognition that all look at the world through a lens of their own adopting, but that a vital test of the lens is that it enables a workable view of the world.
2. Indoctrination: a religious virtue?
Anecdotal and other evidence, suggest that some religious groups, Christian and otherwise, reject 'openness' as a virtue and are explicit about control over learners as an educational goal. Members of groups are given teaching materials shaping the way the text is to be viewed and are told things such as: 'In your discussion group you will hear all the questions answered', and, 'Often there is an open and shut answer to a question.' (BSF, 2&3). Note though that these are control-tending behaviours rather than unqualified indoctrination.
Other voices speak of the importance of openness in the learning process.
The Christian Scriptures use the metaphor of development from fickle, dependent infancy to mature adulthood to describe the goal of ministry (Ephesians 4:11-16). This development is directly linked to having engaged in effective learning processes, one product of which is the exercise of discernment (Hebrews 5:11 - 6:2). A seminal passage in Paul's description of the Christian life refers to an ability to '... test and approve what God's will is ..' (Romans 12;2). The preceding and following contexts suggests that this refers to an ability to form wise Christian judgements about life issues which are not the object of direct Scriptural prescription.
Some conservative Christian writers reflect this openness when discussing the goals of adult Christian education:
'In a sentence, we are to draw persons to God that they may grow in him, maturing in community with other believers, issuing in service to all persons.' (Hill, 1985, p,103-4)
' .. discipleship involves growth throughout life, ... . This growth takes the Christian towards wholeness in body, mind and spirit and in his relationship with God, with others and with God's creation' (Baumohl, 1984, p.8).
Sisemore includes Christian knowledge and conviction, Christian attitudes and appreciation, Christian living and service as goal areas for adult Christian education. (Sisemore, 1970, p.17).
Hestness likewise refers to the purpose of adult education as:
'To enable Christian growth towards maturity and to equip Christians for ministry', and as; 'Experiences in which groups of people come together to study and reflect upon the interrelatedness of their Christian heritage, the world in which they live, and themselves as thinking feeling, acting and willing persons.' (Hestness, 1985, p.39).
Wilhoit mentions: '... Biblical literacy, a delight in the Scriptures, submission to the Bible, an appropriate method of interpreting it, a Christian world view, and use of God's word as a spiritual tool. (Wilhoit, 1986, p.142).
The pattern in these later references is for adult Christian education to have the purposes of growth towards a measure of self-reliance, within deep respect for, and commitment to the Scriptures. Growth and self-reliance are hardly goals compatible with the autonomy-suppressing nature of indoctrination.
Therefore, while some Christian groups may not be embarrassed over a charge of indoctrination and some may practice it, others groups strive for educational openness and disavow indoctrination. It should be noted however, that this is a qualified openness - it is openness within Christian belief structures.
3. The nature of religious education - formative and critical
Religious education involves a balance. On the one hand, a traditional view of religious knowledge includes momentous truth claims and involves recognition of the role of presuppositional commitments in the generation of that knowledge. On the other hand, it is inherently ‘a ... confessional, churchly activity of evangelism, instruction and nurture’ (Astley, 1994, p.9), yet one which seeks to promote maturity and discernment with an absence or minimisation of indoctrination.
Several call for religious education combining formative and critical elements. Hence Cooling who speaks of working within the framework of religious faith and helping growth within it, while encouraging encounter with other frameworks (Cooling, 1994, p.48). Leahy and Laura (1997, p.341) speak of a critical exploration within faith and the importance of helping learners to develop their critical factors by identifying the links between epistemic primitives, assumptions and beliefs (Laura and Leahy, 1989, p.415&422).
Astley (1994, p.106) recognises that religious beliefs function as an ideology and that religious education both forms adherents in the belief system and should help them criticise it. Both formative and critical elements should be present, with the formative normally preceding the critical and critical elements only introduced as is appropriate for each learner (p.73). The formative should be present for educators: '... must beware of giving an account of autonomy that constitutes it as incorporating an untrammelled cognitive freedom. That is not a possible account of what it is to believe and therefore to know anything' (p.206). On the other hand, learning to criticise a tradition from within its basic beliefs is vital to avoid indoctrinating outcomes (p.95). Astley's view is summarised in a Kantian style quote from R.S. Peters: '... content without criticism is blind, but criticism without content is empty' (p.81).
An emphasis on formative and critical religious education modifies the educational goal of autonomy noted earlier. Gardner's (1991, p.79) call for religious education which values autonomy more than faith overlooks the faith element in religious knowledge and the faith goals of religious education. Kazepides concedes that autonomy does not equate to radical free choice, but is coherence within one’s free choices (Kazepides, 1996, p.246). Autonomy and indoctrination are not absolutes but should be defined within and relative to the knowledge and learning community concerned (Astley, 1994, p.96). As Sealey notes, religious educators seek an element of autonomous self-government within faith, while much general education has goals of control and commitment (Sealey, 1983, p.69-71). The drilling of children in correct spelling, mathematical times tables and road-crossing rules are widely accepted examples of indoctrinating behaviours in general education. Autonomy and indoctrination may be in the eyes of the beholders.
Conclusion: indoctrination and education
Different understandings of the nature of knowledge do have impacts on educational activity. However, the nature of those links is more one of degrees of (in)compatibility rather than inevitability. Completely open views of knowledge may be seen as incompatible with indoctrination, just as completely closed views of knowledge may be seen as incompatible with completely open views of education.
(Note, however, that even these assumptions can be challenged. Consider, for example, the case of someone holding a quite closed view of knowledge, but who is so confident of its self-evident truthfulness that they are prepared to embrace radically open pedagogies in the expectation that an honest search for truth will invariably lead learners to their perspective. Or, consider the oft noted pattern where strident dogmatism masks uncertainty about content.)
However, such views of knowledge and education are the (imagined) poles of a continuum between which functioning views of education and knowledge are found. No rational enquiry is possible if any possibility of objective knowledge is denied. Nor are closed approaches to education possible on the recent understandings of knowledge reported above. Recognition that all knowledge involves some degree of 'open' elements of faith, perspective and presuppositions means that religious education which seeks to promote commitment can never properly let education become indoctrination in the unqualified forms noted above.
References
Astley, J. (1994). The Philosophy of Christian Religious Education. Religious Education Press, Birmingham, Al..
Baumohl, A, (1984). Making Adult Disciples . Scripture Union, London.
Bible Study Fellowship, (n.d.). New Member Information. Bible Study Fellowship, San Antonio.
Carr, D. (1994). ‘Knowledge and Truth in Religious Education’, Journal of the Philosophy of Education, 28, 2, 1994, 221-238.
Cooling, T. (1994). ‘The Epistemological Foundations of Modern Religious Education’, Journal of Christian Education, 37, 3, Sept. 1994, 37-50.
Fowler, S. (1998). ‘Rationality, Certainty & Education’. (Unpublished conference paper, National Institute of Christian Education, 1998 Scholarly Conference.)
Gardner, P. (1991). ‘Personal Autonomy & Religious Upbringing,’ Journal of the Philosophy of Education, 25, 1, 1991, 69-83.
Gardner, P. (1996). ‘Four Anxieties and a Reassurance: Hare & McLaughlin on being Open Minded’, Journal of the Philosophy of Education, 30, 2, July 1996, 271-176.
Gates, B. (1996a). ‘Introduction’, In Gates, B. (ed.), Freedom & Authority in Religious Education, Cassell, London,
Gates, B. (1996b) ‘Freedom and Authority in Christianity’, In Gates, B. (ed.), Freedom & Authority in Religious Education. Cassell, London, 18-27.
Geivatt, R.D. & Sweetman, B. Eds. (1992). Contemporary Perspectives on Religious Epistemology, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Hestness, R. (1985). Adult Formation and Discipleship: An Expanded Course Syllabus, Fuller Theological Seminary, Pasadena.
Hill, B. (1985). The Greening of Christian Education. Lancer, Sydney.
Hull, J. (1996). ‘Freedom and Authority in Religious Education’. In Gates, B. (ed.), Freedom & Authority in Religious Education. Cassell, London, 97-113.
Kazepides, T. (1983). ‘Is Religious Education Possible?’ Journal of the Philosophy of Education, 17, 2, 1983, 259-265. Reprinted in Astley, J. & Francis, L.J. (eds.), Critical Perspectives on Christian Education, Gracewing, Leominister, 1994.
Kazepides, T. (1987). ‘Indoctrination, Doctrines and the Foundations of Rationality’, Journal of the Philosophy of Education, 1987, 229-240.
Laura. R.S. & Leahy, M. (1989). ‘Religious Upbringing and Rational Autonomy’ Journal of the Philosophy of Education, 23, 253-265. Reprinted in Astley, J. & Francis, L.J. (eds.), Critical Perspectives on Christian Education, Gracewing, Leominister, 1994.
Leahy, M. (1990). ‘Indoctrination, Evangelism, Catechesis and Religious Education’, British Journal of Religious Education, 12, 1990, 137-144.
Leahy, M & Laura R. (1997). ‘Religious ‘Doctrines’ and the Closure of Minds’, Journal of the Philosophy of Education, 31, 2, 1997.
MacIntyre, A. (1985). ‘Relativism, Power & Authority’. Proceedings & Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 59, 1985, 5-22, Reprinted in Astley, J. & Francis, L.J. (eds.), Critical Perspectives on Christian Education, Gracewing, Leominister, 1994.
Markham, I. (1991). ‘Faith & Reason; reflections on MacIntyre’s ‘tradition constituted enquiry’’, Religious Studies, 27, 1991, 259-267. Reprinted in Astley, J. & Francis, L.J. (eds.), Critical Perspectives on Christian Education, Gracewing, Leominister, 1994.
McLaughlin, T. (1990). ‘P. Gardner on Religious Upbringing and the Liberal Ideal of Religious Autonomy’, Journal of the Philosophy of Education, 24, 1, 1990, 107-126.
McLaughlin, T. (1995). ‘Review of ‘Freedom & Indoctrination in Education’, Sprecker, B & Straughan, R. (ed.s). Journal of the Philosophy of Education, 29,1, March 1995, 155-157.
Morgan, J. (1996). ‘A Defence of Autonomy as an Educational Ideal’, Journal of the Philosophy of Education, 30, 2, July 1996, 239-252.
Peters, R.S. (1983). ‘Philosophy of Education’ in Hirst, P.H. (Ed.), Educational Theory and its Foundation Disciplines, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London.
Phillips, D.Z. (1970). ‘Philosophy and Religious Education’. British Journal of Educational Studies, 18, 1970, 5-27. Reprinted in Astley, J. & Francis, L.J. (eds.), Critical Perspectives on Christian Education, Gracewing, Leominister, 1994.
Sealey, J. (1985). Religious Education: Philosophical Perspectives. Allen & Unwin, London.
Siegal, H. (1995). ‘Radical’ Pedagogy Requires ‘Conservative’ Epistemology’, Journal of the Philosophy of Education, 29, 1, March 1995, 33-46.
Sisemore, J.T. 1970. The Challenge of Adult Christian Education, In Zuck, R. & Getz, G. (eds.) Adult Education in the Church, Moody, Chicago.
Thiessen, E.J. (1982). ‘Indoctrination and doctrines’. Journal of the Philosophy of Education, 16, 3-17. Reprinted in Astley, J. & Francis, L.J. (eds.), Critical Perspectives on Christian Education, Gracewing, Leominister, 1994.
Wilhoit, J. (1986). Christian Education and the Search for Meaning, Baker, Grand Rapids.
